Intersection of Autonomy with Governance

[rahulrazdan][✓ rahulrazdan, 2025-06-16]

For safety-critical systems, the evolution of V&V has been closely linked to regulatory standards frameworks such as ISO 26262. Key elements of this framework include: 1) System Design Process: A structured development assurance approach for complex systems, incorporating safety certification within the integrated development process. 2) Formalization: The formal definition of system operating conditions, functionalities, expected behaviors, risks, and hazards that must be mitigated. 3) Lifecycle Management: The management of components, systems, and development processes throughout their lifecycle. The primary objective was to meticulously and formally define the system design, anticipate expected behaviors and potential issues, and comprehend the impact over the product's lifespan. With the advent of conventional software paradigms, safety-critical V&V adapted by preserving the original system design approach while integrating software as system components. These software components maintained the same overall structure of fault analysis, lifecycle management, and hazard analysis within system design. However, certain aspects required extension. For instance, in the airborne domain, standard DO-178C, which addresses “Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification,” updated the concept of hazard from physical failure mechanisms to functional defects, acknowledging that software does not degrade due to physical processes. Also revised were lifecycle management concepts, reflecting traditional software development practices. Design Assurance Levels (DALs) were incorporated, allowing the integration of software components into system design, functional allocation, performance specification, and the V&V process, akin to SOTIF in the automotive industry.