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en:safeav:as:cybersec [2025/10/29 07:49] – [Table] pczekalskien:safeav:as:cybersec [2025/10/29 07:53] (current) – ToDo checked: pczekalski
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 {{:en:iot-open:czapka_b.png?50| Bachelors (1st level) classification icon }} {{:en:iot-open:czapka_b.png?50| Bachelors (1st level) classification icon }}
  
-<todo @pczekalski></todo>+<todo @pczekalski #pczekalski:2025-10-29></todo>
  
 Drones' cybersecurity covers all aspects of IT security systems, but due to their autonomous operations and the physical presence of potentially dangerous devices, they could have a far greater impact on outcomes, including life-threatening incidents. This is related to their physical presence, including commonly relatively high weight (compared to the human body), high operational speeds and thus large impact energy. Drones' cybersecurity covers all aspects of IT security systems, but due to their autonomous operations and the physical presence of potentially dangerous devices, they could have a far greater impact on outcomes, including life-threatening incidents. This is related to their physical presence, including commonly relatively high weight (compared to the human body), high operational speeds and thus large impact energy.
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 </table> </table>
  
-Domain-specific cybersecurity challenges and threats.+Technically, drones are a blend of robotics and ICT and thus pose domain-specific cybersecurity challenges and threats, which we juxtapose in the table {{ref>table3}} along with estimates of potential impact and mitigation strategies. Many of them are identical or similar to the embedded systems, AI and IoT domains.
  
 +<table table3>
 +<caption> Domain-specific vulnerabilities, threats and their mitigation strategies</caption>
 ^ **Category**                       ^ **Attack / Threat Type**     ^ **Impact**                                 ^ **Mitigation Strategies**                                                       ^ ^ **Category**                       ^ **Attack / Threat Type**     ^ **Impact**                                 ^ **Mitigation Strategies**                                                       ^
 | **Communication & Control Links**  | Jamming (RF denial)          | Loss of command/control, mission abortion  | Frequency hopping, spread-spectrum communications, redundancy (LTE/SAT backup)  | | **Communication & Control Links**  | Jamming (RF denial)          | Loss of command/control, mission abortion  | Frequency hopping, spread-spectrum communications, redundancy (LTE/SAT backup)  |
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 | :::                                | Eavesdropping                | Leakage of telemetry or video              | End-to-end encryption (AES, TLS), mutual authentication                         | | :::                                | Eavesdropping                | Leakage of telemetry or video              | End-to-end encryption (AES, TLS), mutual authentication                         |
 | :::                                | Man-in-the-Middle (MitM)     | Command alteration or injection            | Digital signatures, certificate-based identity, integrity verification          | | :::                                | Man-in-the-Middle (MitM)     | Command alteration or injection            | Digital signatures, certificate-based identity, integrity verification          |
-| **Data Security**                  | Unencrypted transmission     | Theft of mission data, privacy violation   | Use of VPNs or secure links (TLS/DTLS), data minimization                       |+| **Data Security**                  | Unencrypted transmission     | Theft of mission data, privacy violation   | Use of VPNs or secure links (TLS/DTLS), data minimisation |
 | :::                                | Compromised onboard storage  | Exposure of sensitive data after capture   | Encrypted storage, self-wiping memory, tamper detection                         | | :::                                | Compromised onboard storage  | Exposure of sensitive data after capture   | Encrypted storage, self-wiping memory, tamper detection                         |
 | **Software & Firmware Integrity**  | Malicious firmware updates   | Persistent compromise, backdoors           | Signed updates, secure boot, trusted update servers                             | | **Software & Firmware Integrity**  | Malicious firmware updates   | Persistent compromise, backdoors           | Signed updates, secure boot, trusted update servers                             |
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 | **Human Factors**                  | Operator credential theft    | Unauthorized UAV access                    | Multi-factor authentication, training, credential hygiene                       | | **Human Factors**                  | Operator credential theft    | Unauthorized UAV access                    | Multi-factor authentication, training, credential hygiene                       |
 | :::                                | Insider threats              | Intentional sabotage or leakage            | Role-based access, behavior monitoring, background checks                       | | :::                                | Insider threats              | Intentional sabotage or leakage            | Role-based access, behavior monitoring, background checks                       |
- +</table>
- +
-Good practices.+
  
en/safeav/as/cybersec.1761724172.txt.gz · Last modified: 2025/10/29 07:49 by pczekalski
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