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en:safeav:as:cybersec [2025/10/29 07:40] pczekalskien:safeav:as:cybersec [2025/10/29 07:53] (current) – ToDo checked: pczekalski
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 {{:en:iot-open:czapka_b.png?50| Bachelors (1st level) classification icon }} {{:en:iot-open:czapka_b.png?50| Bachelors (1st level) classification icon }}
  
-<todo @pczekalski></todo>+<todo @pczekalski #pczekalski:2025-10-29></todo>
  
 Drones' cybersecurity covers all aspects of IT security systems, but due to their autonomous operations and the physical presence of potentially dangerous devices, they could have a far greater impact on outcomes, including life-threatening incidents. This is related to their physical presence, including commonly relatively high weight (compared to the human body), high operational speeds and thus large impact energy. Drones' cybersecurity covers all aspects of IT security systems, but due to their autonomous operations and the physical presence of potentially dangerous devices, they could have a far greater impact on outcomes, including life-threatening incidents. This is related to their physical presence, including commonly relatively high weight (compared to the human body), high operational speeds and thus large impact energy.
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 </table> </table>
  
 +Cybersecurity for drones includes all their components (hardware and software), procedures, and operations. Below is in a table {{ref>table2}}, there is a short list of those components with characteristics:
  
-<todo @Pczekalski>Continue here</todo> +<table table2>
-Cybersecurity for drones includes all their components (hardware and software), procedures, and operations. Below is in a table {{ref>table2}} there is a short list of those components with characteristics: +
- +
-<table tab_label>+
 <caption>Drone cybersecurity components</caption> <caption>Drone cybersecurity components</caption>
 ^ Area ^ Short Explanation ^ ^ Area ^ Short Explanation ^
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 </table> </table>
  
 +Technically, drones are a blend of robotics and ICT and thus pose domain-specific cybersecurity challenges and threats, which we juxtapose in the table {{ref>table3}} along with estimates of potential impact and mitigation strategies. Many of them are identical or similar to the embedded systems, AI and IoT domains.
  
- +<table table3> 
- +<caption> Domain-specific vulnerabilities, threats and their mitigation strategies</caption> 
- +^ **Category**                       ^ **Attack / Threat Type**     ^ **Impact**                                 ^ **Mitigation Strategies**                                                       
- +| **Communication & Control Links**  | Jamming (RF denial)          | Loss of command/control, mission abortion  | Frequency hopping, spread-spectrum communications, redundancy (LTE/SAT backup)  
- +:::                                | Spoofing (GPS/Command)       | UAV hijacking or route deviation           | Encrypted control channels, GNSS authentication, sensor fusion for validation   
-Domain-specific cybersecurity challenges and threats. +:::                                | Eavesdropping                | Leakage of telemetry or video              | End-to-end encryption (AES, TLS), mutual authentication                         
- +:::                                | Man-in-the-Middle (MitM)     | Command alteration or injection            | Digital signatures, certificate-based identity, integrity verification          
-^ **Category** ^ **Attack / Threat Type** ^ **Impact** ^ **Mitigation Strategies** ^ +| **Data Security**                  | Unencrypted transmission     | Theft of mission data, privacy violation   | Use of VPNs or secure links (TLS/DTLS), data minimisation 
-| **Communication & Control Links** | Jamming (RF denial) | Loss of command/control, mission abortion | Frequency hopping, spread-spectrum communications, redundancy (LTE/SAT backup) | +:::                                | Compromised onboard storage  | Exposure of sensitive data after capture   | Encrypted storage, self-wiping memory, tamper detection                         
- | Spoofing (GPS/Command) | UAV hijacking or route deviation | Encrypted control channels, GNSS authentication, sensor fusion for validation | +| **Software & Firmware Integrity**  | Malicious firmware updates   | Persistent compromise, backdoors           | Signed updates, secure boot, trusted update servers                             
- | Eavesdropping | Leakage of telemetry or video | End-to-end encryption (AES, TLS), mutual authentication | +:::                                | Outdated software            | Exploitable vulnerabilities                | Regular patching, vulnerability scanning                                        
- | Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) | Command alteration or injection | Digital signatures, certificate-based identity, integrity verification | +:::                                | Malware infection            | Unauthorized control or data theft         | Air-gapped maintenance, USB/media controls, antivirus monitoring                
-| **Data Security** | Unencrypted transmission | Theft of mission data, privacy violation | Use of VPNs or secure links (TLS/DTLS), data minimization +| **Navigation Systems**             | GPS spoofing                 | False navigation, crash, or theft          | Multi-sensor fusion (INS + GNSS + vision), anomaly detection                    
- | Compromised onboard storage | Exposure of sensitive data after capture | Encrypted storage, self-wiping memory, tamper detection | +:::                                | GPS jamming                  | Position loss, uncontrolled drift          | Anti-jam antennas, inertial backup navigation                                   
-| **Software & Firmware Integrity** | Malicious firmware updates | Persistent compromise, backdoors | Signed updates, secure boot, trusted update servers | +| **Hardware & Supply Chain**        | Hardware backdoors           | Hidden persistent access                   | Supply chain vetting, component attestation, hardware testing                   
- | Outdated software | Exploitable vulnerabilities | Regular patching, vulnerability scanning | +:::                                | Physical capture             | Reverse engineering, key extraction        | Encrypted memory, tamper-resistant enclosures, key rotation                     
- | Malware infection | Unauthorized control or data theft | Air-gapped maintenance, USB/media controls, antivirus monitoring | +| **Network & Cloud Systems**        | Ground control compromise    | Full UAV fleet takeover                    | Network segmentation, multi-factor authentication, IDS/IPS                      
-| **Navigation Systems** | GPS spoofing | False navigation, crash, or theft | Multi-sensor fusion (INS + GNSS + vision), anomaly detection | +:::                                | Cloud data breach            | Exposure of telemetry or missions          | Strong access control, encryption at rest/in transit, audit logs                
- | GPS jamming | Position loss, uncontrolled drift | Anti-jam antennas, inertial backup navigation | +:::                                | API abuse                    | Unauthorized remote commands               | API authentication, rate limiting, token-based access                           
-| **Hardware & Supply Chain** | Hardware backdoors | Hidden persistent access | Supply chain vetting, component attestation, hardware testing | +| **AI & Autonomy**                  | Adversarial AI input         | Misclassification, unsafe actions          | Robust AI training, adversarial testing, sensor redundancy                      
- | Physical capture | Reverse engineering, key extraction | Encrypted memory, tamper-resistant enclosures, key rotation | +:::                                | Model poisoning              | Manipulated learning behavior              | Secure dataset curation, signed models, anomaly detection                       
-| **Network & Cloud Systems** | Ground control compromise | Full UAV fleet takeover | Network segmentation, multi-factor authentication, IDS/IPS | +| **System Resilience**              | Single points of failure     | System-wide outage                         | Distributed control, redundant communication paths                              
- | Cloud data breach | Exposure of telemetry or missions | Strong access control, encryption at rest/in transit, audit logs | +:::                                | Poor fail-safe design        | Crashes during disruption                  | Secure failover modes, autonomous return-to-base logic                          
- | API abuse | Unauthorized remote commands | API authentication, rate limiting, token-based access | +| **Regulatory & Standards**         | Lack of standards            | Inconsistent security posture              | Adoption of DO-326A / NIST frameworks, international harmonization              
-| **AI & Autonomy** | Adversarial AI input | Misclassification, unsafe actions | Robust AI training, adversarial testing, sensor redundancy | +:::                                | Weak certification           | Deployment of insecure UAVs                | Third-party audits, mandatory penetration testing                               
- | Model poisoning | Manipulated learning behavior | Secure dataset curation, signed models, anomaly detection | +| **Human Factors**                  | Operator credential theft    | Unauthorized UAV access                    | Multi-factor authentication, training, credential hygiene                       
-| **System Resilience** | Single points of failure | System-wide outage | Distributed control, redundant communication paths | +:::                                | Insider threats              | Intentional sabotage or leakage            | Role-based access, behavior monitoring, background checks                       
- | Poor fail-safe design | Crashes during disruption | Secure failover modes, autonomous return-to-base logic | +</table>
-| **Regulatory & Standards** | Lack of standards | Inconsistent security posture | Adoption of DO-326A / NIST frameworks, international harmonization | +
- | Weak certification | Deployment of insecure UAVs | Third-party audits, mandatory penetration testing | +
-| **Human Factors** | Operator credential theft | Unauthorized UAV access | Multi-factor authentication, training, credential hygiene | +
- | Insider threats | Intentional sabotage or leakage | Role-based access, behavior monitoring, background checks | +
- +
- +
-Good practices.+
  
en/safeav/as/cybersec.1761723635.txt.gz · Last modified: 2025/10/29 07:40 by pczekalski
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