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| en:safeav:as:cybersec [2025/10/29 07:30] – [Table] pczekalski | en:safeav:as:cybersec [2025/10/29 07:53] (current) – ToDo checked: pczekalski | ||
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| - | <todo @pczekalski></ | + | <todo @pczekalski |
| - | Drones' | + | Drones' |
| - | Below, we briefly describe | + | |
| + | Below, we briefly describe the most important areas and list domain-specific challenges. UAV applications grow in both well-established and new environments, | ||
| Autonomous systems vary in size and complexity, and thus differ in vulnerability to hacking and potential environmental harm in the event of compromise. Unauthorised access may have a dual nature and related consequences: | Autonomous systems vary in size and complexity, and thus differ in vulnerability to hacking and potential environmental harm in the event of compromise. Unauthorised access may have a dual nature and related consequences: | ||
| * hacking of an unmanaged system and its intentional use with a different target than formerly planned (e.g. flight plan change) - done usually via professional hackers that study the system and its vulnerabilities, | * hacking of an unmanaged system and its intentional use with a different target than formerly planned (e.g. flight plan change) - done usually via professional hackers that study the system and its vulnerabilities, | ||
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| Both cases are raising serious dangers to life and property. | Both cases are raising serious dangers to life and property. | ||
| - | In the table {{ref> | + | In the table {{ref> |
| <table table1> | <table table1> | ||
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| </ | </ | ||
| - | <todo @Pczekalski> | + | Cybersecurity for drones includes all their components (hardware and software), procedures, and operations. Below is in a table {{ref>table2}}, there is a short list of those components with characteristics: |
| + | <table table2> | ||
| + | < | ||
| + | ^ Area ^ Short Explanation ^ | ||
| + | | Electronics Security | Protection of onboard hardware against tampering, spoofing, physical intrusion, electromagnetic interference, | ||
| + | | Firmware Security | Secure bootloaders, | ||
| + | | Communication Security | Encryption, authentication, | ||
| + | | Control System Security | Hardening of flight control logic, autopilot algorithms, ground station software, and mission planning tools to avoid unauthorised takeover. | | ||
| + | | Operational Safety & Procedures | Secure operator authentication, | ||
| + | | Sensor Security | Protection of GPS, IMU, cameras, LiDAR, and barometers from spoofing, jamming, blinding, or data manipulation attacks. | | ||
| + | | Payload Security | Ensuring attached cameras, delivery modules, or sensors cannot be hijacked, misused, or leak data. | | ||
| + | | Cloud / Backend Security | Hardening remote servers, APIs, fleet-management dashboards, and databases against breaches or unauthorised access. | | ||
| + | | Supply Chain Security | Verification of trusted hardware vendors, protection against backdoored components, counterfeit parts, or tampered devices. | | ||
| + | | Data Security & Privacy | Encryption at rest and in transit, secure storage, access control, and compliance with data protection laws. | | ||
| + | | GNSS & Navigation Security | GPS anti-spoofing, | ||
| + | | Power & Battery Safety | Protection from sabotage of batteries or power systems, overload attacks, and unsafe discharge caused by malicious commands. | | ||
| + | | Physical Security / Anti-Tamper | Tamper-evident housings, secure key storage, self-wipe triggers for sensitive data, and resistance to physical compromise. | | ||
| + | | Redundancy, Fail-safe & Recovery | Secure fallback communication, | ||
| + | | Regulatory Compliance | Meeting aviation cybersecurity standards, radio spectrum rules, Remote ID compliance, and safety certification. | | ||
| + | </ | ||
| - | General concepts | + | Technically, |
| - | * electronics | + | |
| - | * firmware | + | |
| - | * communication | + | |
| - | * control section | + | |
| - | * operations safety | + | |
| - | Domain-specific | + | <table table3> |
| - | + | < | |
| - | ^ **Category** ^ **Attack / Threat Type** ^ **Impact** ^ **Mitigation Strategies** ^ | + | ^ **Category** |
| - | | **Communication & Control Links** | Jamming (RF denial) | Loss of command/ | + | | **Communication & Control Links** |
| - | | | Spoofing (GPS/ | + | | ::: |
| - | | | Eavesdropping | Leakage of telemetry or video | End-to-end encryption (AES, TLS), mutual authentication | | + | | ::: |
| - | | | Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) | Command alteration or injection | Digital signatures, certificate-based identity, integrity verification | | + | | ::: |
| - | | **Data Security** | Unencrypted transmission | Theft of mission data, privacy violation | Use of VPNs or secure links (TLS/DTLS), data minimization | + | | **Data Security** |
| - | | | Compromised onboard storage | Exposure of sensitive data after capture | Encrypted storage, self-wiping memory, tamper detection | | + | | ::: |
| - | | **Software & Firmware Integrity** | Malicious firmware updates | Persistent compromise, backdoors | Signed updates, secure boot, trusted update servers | | + | | **Software & Firmware Integrity** |
| - | | | Outdated software | Exploitable vulnerabilities | Regular patching, vulnerability scanning | | + | | ::: |
| - | | | Malware infection | Unauthorized control or data theft | Air-gapped maintenance, | + | | ::: |
| - | | **Navigation Systems** | GPS spoofing | False navigation, crash, or theft | Multi-sensor fusion (INS + GNSS + vision), anomaly detection | | + | | **Navigation Systems** |
| - | | | GPS jamming | Position loss, uncontrolled drift | Anti-jam antennas, inertial backup navigation | | + | | ::: |
| - | | **Hardware & Supply Chain** | Hardware backdoors | Hidden persistent access | Supply chain vetting, component attestation, | + | | **Hardware & Supply Chain** |
| - | | | Physical capture | Reverse engineering, | + | | ::: |
| - | | **Network & Cloud Systems** | Ground control compromise | Full UAV fleet takeover | Network segmentation, | + | | **Network & Cloud Systems** |
| - | | | Cloud data breach | Exposure of telemetry or missions | Strong access control, encryption at rest/in transit, audit logs | | + | | ::: |
| - | | | API abuse | Unauthorized remote commands | API authentication, | + | | ::: |
| - | | **AI & Autonomy** | Adversarial AI input | Misclassification, | + | | **AI & Autonomy** |
| - | | | Model poisoning | Manipulated learning behavior | Secure dataset curation, signed models, anomaly detection | | + | | ::: |
| - | | **System Resilience** | Single points of failure | System-wide outage | Distributed control, redundant communication paths | | + | | **System Resilience** |
| - | | | Poor fail-safe design | Crashes during disruption | Secure failover modes, autonomous return-to-base logic | | + | | ::: |
| - | | **Regulatory & Standards** | Lack of standards | Inconsistent security posture | Adoption of DO-326A / NIST frameworks, international harmonization | | + | | **Regulatory & Standards** |
| - | | | Weak certification | Deployment of insecure UAVs | Third-party audits, mandatory penetration testing | | + | | ::: |
| - | | **Human Factors** | Operator credential theft | Unauthorized UAV access | Multi-factor authentication, | + | | **Human Factors** |
| - | | | Insider threats | Intentional sabotage or leakage | Role-based access, behavior monitoring, background checks | | + | | ::: |
| - | + | </ | |
| - | + | ||
| - | Good practices. | + | |